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Chinese Naval Threat:  
Growth and Modernization 
Haley M. Halstead 
 
The military evolution and modernization of 
China’s navy highlight its increasing level of 
threat to the United States. The power and 
influence of the U.S. Navy are at risk, as are 
U.S interests abroad. China’s naval growth and 
strategic goals need to be examined in order to 
establish a level of threat.  
 
China’s navy has progressed significantly since 
the 1990s,102 with current efforts to 
simultaneously modernize and expand the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).103 The 
Chinese navy has shifted immensely in the 
past two decades; it has progressed in 
technological advancements as well as in size, 
with astonishing speed. The PLAN is rapidly 
becoming a force that can threaten the U.S. 
Navy. Understanding the PLAN’s history, 
growth and goals is essential to analyze their 
threat to U.S. naval interests. 
In the 1990s, China initiated a military 
overhaul, thereby significantly expanding its 
military budget.104 Naval expenses are 
relatively transparent; the PLAN purchased and 
continues to purchase new weapons and ships, 
while training personnel to operate them.105 
According to GlobalSecurity.org, 
 
The Chinese military budget, at official 
exchange rates, is one-seventh that of the 
United States. But on a more appropriate 
purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, the 
Chinese military expenditure is about 
$500,000,000,000, about three-quarters 
that of the United States.106 
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These budget expansions are evident in the 
weapon acquisitions of the PLAN. The Chinese 
navy is purchasing new anti-ship ballistic 
missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, land-attack 
cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, mines, 
manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, 
submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers, 
frigates, patrol craft, amphibious ships, mine 
countermeasures ships, hospital ships, and 
supporting command, control, communication, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance systems.107 In addition to this 
new technology, maintenance, logistics, naval 
doctrine, personnel quality, education and 
training reforms have been implemented by 
PLAN to modernize their forces.108  
 
Background photo: GlobalSecurity.org. Beijing Travel Blog, 
http://blog.beijingholiday.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/china-money.jpg. 
 
The overall naval goal of the People’s 
Republic of China is to become the dominant 
force in surrounding seas.109 Within that broad 
spectrum, PLAN objectives include protecting 
Chinese territory, enforcing Chinese policies, 
eliminating the influence of the United States, 
and displaying a strong projection of Chinese 
military strength.110 According to Ronald 
O’Rourke, a specialist in naval affairs, the 
PLAN strives to be an “anti-access force,” a 
strong enough force to discourage other 
countries, including the Unites States, from 
interfering in their affairs.111 This includes 
deterring foreign diplomatic and military 
interference. China’s desire for expanding its 
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influence and control is apparent in their recent 
port acquisitions. “China has either built or 
reportedly planned to construct vital facilities in 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Maldives, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and 
Thailand,”112 according to Patrick Mendis. 
These strategic port locations, known as “a 
string of pearls,” are strategically positioned 
along trade routes leading from the Indian 
Ocean to the South China Sea.113  
 
Map: “China’s ‘String of pearls’ strategy to secure the ports of South Asia.” 
Global Balita. http://globalbalita.com/?s=china+string+of+pearls. 
 
In 2005, the Department of Defense 
defined this “string of pearls strategy,” as  a 
 
…three pronged approach. First, China is 
building a series of naval bases along sea 
lanes to the Middle East; second, it is 
strengthening diplomatic ties with 
countries in the region. Third, the Chinese 
are rapidly building a blue-water navy, 
developing advanced missile technology, 
deploying new submarines, and 
stockpiling undersea mines to counter 
U.S. Navy capabilities and protect their 
energy security.114 
 
An important issue for the U.S. to 
consider is how China’s military goals might 
incur negative relations between China and 
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Taiwan.115 China and Taiwan have 
experienced high tension since the Chinese 
Revolution in 1949.116 The U.S. should 
consider China’s power and animosity for 
Taiwan, especially in light of U.S. interest and 
partnership with Taiwan. Chinese President Hu 
Jintao declared that China desires to be a 
“maritime power.”117 Bonnie Glaser, senior 
advisor for Asia at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies stated, “This is very 
significant language. It creates questions of 
American capability.”118 Because of U.S. 
partnership with Taiwan, Chinese naval forces 
could pose a strategic risk to the Asia-Pacific 
policy of the U.S. 
In June 1991, Mount Pinatubo volcano 
erupted in the Philippians, destroying the 
evacuated Clark Air Base and requiring the 
evacuation of Subic Bay Naval Base.119 The 
evacuation of these bases signaled the 
beginning of the end for a strong naval 
presence in China’s surrounding seas.120 This 
poses the possibility of future conflict with the 
PLAN, as China’s naval progression is 
consistently surpassing U.S. expectations.121  
According to the National Intelligence 
Director Michael McConnell, in the near future, 
“China will be America’s only global competitor 
for military and strategic influence.”122 China 
has continually portrayed their military growth 
as a protective and defensive measure, 
attempting to show friendly intentions through 
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diplomatic relations with their neighboring 
countries and the United States.123 
 There are two questions that U.S. 
military leaders and foreign policy advisors 
must address: 1) is China, based on their 
military history and foreign policy, capable of 
military expansion without conquering or 
overpowering neighboring nations? 2) Is China 
capable of continuing peaceful relations with 
the U.S. once they become a force strong 
enough to challenge U.S. hegemony? The U.S. 
has always aided its allies when they face 
overwhelming forces. Very soon, the United 
States may be forced to choose between 
reevaluating the way in which it supports its 
allies and challenging the Chinese Navy.
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